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L ast October, a group of distinguished tax experts from the European Union and the United States convened at 
the University of Michigan Law School for a conference on 
"Comparative Fiscal Federalism: Comparing the U.S. Supreme 
Court and European Court of JusticeTax Jurisprudence."The 
conference was sponsored by the Law School, the European 
Union Center, and Harvard Law School's Fund for Tax and 
Fiscal Research. Attendees from Europe included Michel 
Aujean, the principal tax official at the EU Commission, 
Servaas vanThie1, chief tax advisor to the EU Council, Michael 
Lang (Vienna) and Kees van Raad (Leiden), who run the two 
largest tax U.M. on the European continent, and 
many other distinguished guests. The U. S. contingent included 
Michael Graetz of Yale Law School, Alvin Warren of Harvard 
Law School, Walter Hellerstein of the University of Georgia 
(widely recognized as the preeminent U. S. state tax scholar), 
and other important academics. Michigan was represented 
by Professors Kyle Logue and Daniel Halberstam of the Law 
School, Jim Hines of the Economics Department, and myself as 
conference organizer. 
The impetus for the conference, the first of its kind, was a 
series of decisions by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in 
the last 20 years, but with increasing frequency in the last five. 
In those decisions the ECJ interpreted the Treaty of Rome (the 
"constitution" of the EU) aggressively to strike down numerous 
member state income tax rules on the grounds that they were 
discriminatory.-For example, the ECJ ruled that Finland cannot 
grant tax credits for corporate tax paid to Finnish shareholders, 
but refuse them to foreign shareholders. In another case, the 
ECJ struck down Germany's rules that restricted the deduct- 
ibility of interest to foreign lenders, even though the rules also 
applied to tax-exempt domestic lenders. Other examples of 
provisions struck down by the ECJ are: 
a dividend tax credit granted to resident companies but 
refused to the branch of a company having its seat in another 
member state; 
a refund of overpaid income tax granted to permanent 
residents but refused to taxpayers moving to another member 
state during the tax year; 
personal reliefs granted to residents but refused to non- 
residents even where they could not benefit from such reliefs in 
their member state of residence; 
a business relief (a tax deduction for transfers of funds to 
a pension reserve) granted to residents but refused to non- 
residents. 
When we compare this line of cases to the U. S. Supreme 
Court's treatment of state taxes under the U.S. Constitution 
(most often under the Commerce Clause, but sometimes under 
the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses), the differ- 
ence is striking. In general, the Supreme Court has granted 
wide leeway to the states to adopt any tax system they wish, 
only striking down the most egregious cases of discrimination 
against out of state residents.Thus, for example, the Court has 
refused to intervene against rampant state tax competition to 
attract business into the state. It has twice upheld a method of 
calculating how much of a multinational enterprise's income 
can be taxed by a state that is widely seen as both incompatible 
with the methods used by the federal government and other 
countries, and as potentially producing double taxation. And it 
has allowed states to impose higher income taxes on importers 
than on exporters through the use of so-called "single factor 
sales formulas," under which a business pays tax to the state 
only if it makes sales to residents of the state, but not if it makes 
sales outside the state. 
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On the face of it, this contrast is surprising. After all, the ECJ 
is dealing with fully sovereign countries, and taxation is one of 
the primary attributes of sovereignty. Moreover, the authority 
of the ECJ to strike down member state direct taxes is unclear. 
The Treaty of Rome generally reserves competence in direct 
taxation to the member states, and all EU-wide changes in 
direct taxation have to be approved unanimously by all  25 
member states. Nevertheless, the ECJ has since the 1980s inter- 
preted the "four freedoms" embodied in the Treaty of Rome 
(free movement of goods, services, persons, and capital) to give 
it the authority to strike down direct tax mqsures that it views 
as incompatible with the freedoms. 
The Supreme Court, on the other hand, has clear authority 
under the Supremacy Clause to strike down state laws that are 
incompatible with the Constitution. As Justice Oliver Wendell 
Holmes observed, the United States will not be hurt if the 
power to review federal laws were taken away from the Court, 
but it could not survive if the Court lost its power over state 
legislation. Moreover, the states are not fully sovereign, and 
(unlike member states that are represented in the EU Council), 
are not even directly represented in Congress, so that the Court 
could strike down their laws without (in most cases) expecting 
an outcry from the other branches of the federal government. 
What is the explanation for the contrast? Part of the reason 
is that member state taxes in the EU are more important than 
state taxes in the United States, because most taxes in the 
United States are paid to the federal government, whereas all 
taxes in the EU are paid to member states. Thus, even high tax 
states like New York or California have income tax rates in the 
low double digits, whereas member state tax rates a n  reach 40 
percent for corporations and 60 percent for individuals. 
However, this cannot be the whole answer, because the U.S. 
Supreme Court adopted its lenient attitude to state taxation 
before there were federal taxes (the federal corporate tax only 
began in 1 909, and the federal income tax in 19 1 3, long after 
the states began taxing income). Instead, the answer lies in 
merent  conceptions of federalism. 
In the United States, the country began as a loose (runfedera- 
tion of sovereign states. The issue of state sovereignty' loomed 
large in the formatidh of the constitution and tbereafter 
through the Civil War, and the concept of state rights s$U j )II 
resonates strongly today. As a result, in the United States, feder; 
alism means that the f e b l  government should respect the 
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sovereignty of the states as much as is compatible with the need 
to have a unified country. Taxes are essential to.sovereignty, and 
therefore the Supreme Court has always m e d  a defer- 
ential attitude to state choices in ma t t e~of  taxation, even if it 
resulted in some level of discriminati& against out of staters. 
The Court intervenes only when the tax is blatantly discrirnina- 
tory, such as New Hampshire's attempt to adopt an income tax 
only for non-residents who commute into the state. 
In the EU, on the other hand, there is no unified central 
government, but there is a background of bitter wars between 
sovereign states. As a result, there is a wish among some for 
the creation of a "United States of Europe." That god has so 
far proven elusive, but the focus of thefederalists has been 
to advance it by enhancingthe economic union that underlay 
the formation of the EU. ahus, the ECJ has taken the lead 
in trying to create a meanin@ single market. It, and .the 
EU Commission (which brings many of the tax cases before 
the ECJ), see discrimhation h direct tax matters as a major 
obstacle to the achievement of this goal. Ultimately, m y  
observers feel that the ECJ is trying to force member state4 to 
abandon the unanimity rdk for direct tax matters and even to 
achieve direct tax harmonization, such as the hakionizatj~n 
already used for indirect taxes (consumption taxes, such as VAT, 
are harmonized in the EU by the Sixth Directive, adopted by 
unanimous consent wh& the ELI was much smaller). 
Given this divergence of political context, can the ECJ and 
the Supreme Court learn s o m e ~ , f r o m  each other's tax juris- 
~rudence? I believe the answer is yes, and that the conference 
showed some of the lessons each can learn from the other. 
For the U.S. Supreme Court, I believe the EU experience 
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shows that it is sometimes too lenient in state tax matters. In 
particular, permitting states to compete for the location of 
investment by multinationals by granting tax incentives has 
proven to be very costly for the states, while not bringing any 
benefit to the United States as a whole (since the multinational 
typically has decided to invest somewhere in the United States 
already). Such tax competition creates a "race to the bottomsn in 
which states only grant incentives to prevent the multinational 
fiom going elsewhere, not because they believe the benefits of 
the investment truly j u s q  the cost in foregone tax revenue. In 
Europe, such incentives are banned by the state aid provisions 
of theTreaty of Rome, which are strictly interpreted by the 
Commission and the ECJ to prohibit all tax incentives that are 
targeted at particular taxpayers. 
Fortunately, the Supreme Court has just accepted a case 
from Ohio that raises this issue directly. In 1998, the City of 
Toledo granted DaimlerChrysler $280 million in tax incentives 
to expand its factory there, rather than move it to Michigan 
or elsewhere in the United States. The Sixth Circuit Court 
of Appeals in Cuno v. DaimlerChrysler held that such targeted 
tax incentives violate the Commerce Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution. If the Supreme Court is willing to learn from the 
ECJ in this regard, it should affirm that decision. 
What about the ECJ learning from the Supreme Court? Here 
as well, a recent decision illustrates a learning opportunity. In 
Mark and Spencer, the issue was whether the UK is obligated to 
allow losses incurred by Marks & Spencer's foreign subsidiaries 
to offset income earned by the UK parent, because under UK 
rules it can use losses by domestic subsidiaries to offset income 
of the parent. The big difference, of course, is that the domestic 
subsidiaries are subject to tax at the same rate as the parent, 
while the foreign subsidiaries can be in Estonia, where there 
is no corporate tax, or in Ireland, where the tax rate is only 
12.5%. The ECJ ruled on December 1 3,2005, that the UK 
must allow the loss offsets even though it cannot tax the foreign 
subsidiaries. 
It is widely believed that the ECJ ruled the w v  it did in 
order to force the political branches of the EU to move toward 
corporate tax rate harmonization, as the Commission h 
advocated (to no avail) for many years. But here the ECJ can 
learn a lesson from the U.S. Supreme Court: Deciding cases in 
order to force action by the legislature can be dangerous. 
This rule can be illustrated by the Quill case, decided by the 
Supreme Court in 199 1. The case involved a question that had 
confronted the Court before: Under what circumstances can 
a state force retailers that sell into the state by remote means, 
such as catalogues or (nowadays) via the Internet, to collect 
the sales tax due on the purchases?The tax is clearly due, but 
relying on the buyers to pay it voluntarily is hopeless, so collec- 
tion by the remote vendor is the only practical way to enforce 
the tax. 
In 1967, the Court held that the vendor cannot be made 
to collect the tax unless it had a physical presence (like a 
warehouse) in the state, relying on both the Due Process 
and Commerce Clauses of the Constitution. Most observers 
expected when the Court accepted the Quill case that it would 
overturn that decision, given the phenomenal growth of the 
remote sales industry between 1967 and 1991 . Instead, the 
Court held that the physical presence test still applies, but only 
under the Commerce Clause, not the Due Process clause. 
The reason the Court adopted this approach is clear: 
Commerce Clause decisions can be changed by Congress 
through simple legislation, since the Constitution gives 
Congress the power to regulate commerce among the states, 
but Congress is powerless to overcome decisions under the Due 
Process Clause. The Court thus expected Congress to intervene 
and set rules under which states can force remote vendors to 
collect sales taxes. 
Fourteen years have passed, and Congress has not acted. The 
reason is simple: The states are not represented in Congress, so 
Congress cares more about the remote sales industry with its 
~owerful lobbv than abo tax revenues. In the meantime, 
Conference organizer and Law Pm@ssor Reuven Avi-Yonah chats with a 
conference attendee above, and at right with potticipants~ames Hines 
of the University of Michigan's Ross hsiness School and Hugh ~ u d  of 
Boston College Low School. 
the Internet has sprung into existence, remote sales now top 
$100 billion per year, and state sales tax revenues are rapidly 
shrinking. 
The lesson for the ECJ is thus not to decide cases in the 
expectation that the political branches will act. Many member 
states are vehemently opposed to direct tax harmonization. 
The UK, for example, is more likely to react to losing Marks 
and Spencer b y  abolishing its domestic loss offset rules than 
by giving up on the unanimity requirement in direct taxes. 
Thus, the lesson for the ECJ is that it should be more careful 
about dismantling member states' income taxes, because such 
decisions can have unexpected consequences. 
More broadly, I believe comparing the U. k. and EU experi- 
ences shows that there is more than one way of constructing a 
single market without tax distortions, and that some level of 
distortion can be accepted. Thus, the U. S. Supreme Court can 
&ord to be a bit more harsh without trampling down on state 
sovereignty on tax matters, and the ECJ can afford to be more 
lenient without aeating unacceptable barriers to trade and 
investment within the EU. 
I hope this conference is just the beginning of a series of 
discussions between EU and U.S. tax experts on these issues. A 
conference volume will be published next year, and a follow-up 
conference is tentatively scheduled for 2007-by which time 
we will ahso know how Cuno came out. 
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, the Irwin I. Cohn Professor o f l a w  and 
director ofthe International 7bx LL. M. Program, ,specializes in inter- 
national taxation and international la& and is widely published in 
these subject areas. He blso served as consultant to the US .  Treasury 
on tax competition and OECD on mx competition, and is a memb r 
ofthe Steering Group ofthe OECD's International NctworkJok T 
Research and ofthe Michigan Governor's Commission on ~ i b u n a l  
Rcform. Profcor Avi- Yonah ekned his B. A., summa cum laude,jom \\ 
Hebrew University and then earned three degreesfiom Harvard: an 
A.M. in history, a Ph. D. in history, and a J  D., m a p a  cum laude,jom 
Harvard Law School. Avi-Yonuh has been a v i s i tqpro fcor  $law 
at the University ofMichigan, NewYbrk Uwersity, and the University 
ofPennrylvania. He has also served as an dssistant professor oflaw at 
Harvard and as an assistant professor ofhistory at Boston College. In 
addition, he has practiced law with Milbank, Tweed, Hadly  &McCloy, 
Ne'wYork; Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen U a t z ,  NewYork; and Ropes &Gray, 
Boston. His teaching interestrfocus on various apccu oftaxation and 
international law, on the origins and development ofthe corporate form, 
and on China and globajization. 
31 
